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Abstract—Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) were 
mainly designed to prove address ownership and to prevent the 
theft of existing IPv6 addresses by binding the owner’s public key 
to the generated address. The address owner uses a 
corresponding private key to prove its ownership by using signed 
messages that are originated from that address. Though the CGA 
approach is quite useful in providing a means of proving address 
ownership in IPv6 networks, it does have some limitations and 
some vulnerabilities. In this paper we will provide a security 
analysis and descriptions of possible ways of attacking CGA. We 
found that the CGA verification process is prone mainly to 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. We also found that CGAs are 
still susceptible to privacy related attacks. We will therefore 
propose some extensions to the CGA standard verification 
algorithm to mitigate DoS attacks and to make CGA more 
privacy-conscious. 
Keywords- IPv6 Security; IPv6 Privacy; Authentication of IPv6 
addresses; IPv6 addresses ownership 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the absence of a reliable authentication mechanism, it is 
easy to fabricate forged IPv6 messages which lead to various 
types of attacks. In the IPv6 network, Neighbor Discovery 
Protocol (NDP) assumes that all nodes on the link trust each 
other. However, this assumption does not hold for a number of 
scenarios one of which is over a wireless network where 
anyone can join a local link either with a minimal or with no 
link layer authentication. Consequently, an attacker can 
impersonate legitimate nodes by forging NDP messages in 
order to generate Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, and instigate 
theft and traffic spoofing. 
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) [1] were 
first proposed in order to provide the necessary authentication 
for IPv6 addresses. CGAs are IPv6 addresses where the 
interface identifier (ID) portion of the addressing scheme (the 
64-rightmost bits of IPv6 address) is created from a 
cryptographic hash of the address owner’s public key and other 
auxiliary parameters. The address owner uses a corresponding 
private key to sign messages sent from that address. In this 
manner the CGA technique enables the address owner to prove 
address ownership by binding the public key signature to an 
IPv6 address. 
The self-certified feature of CGA is its main advantage. No 
third party or additional security infrastructure is needed. The 
CGA approach can thus be scaled up for large networks. Any 
node can generate its own CGA address locally and then only 
the address and the public key are needed to verify the binding 
between the public key and the address. CGA also works 
automatically without the need for manual user configuration. 
Although CGA is a promising security technique for use 
with IPv6 addresses, there are some limitations and 
disadvantages. The main disadvantage of using CGA is the 
computational time necessary to generate the address. Also, 
CGA is not a complete security solution; it still exhibits 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities to threats. For instance, CGA 
cannot provide the assurance needed with respect to the 
authority of the node so there is no guarantee that the CGA 
address was created from the appropriate node. Attackers can 
thus exploit this weakness to create a new valid address from 
their own public key. Attackers can also capture Neighbor 
Discovery (ND) messages and alter the sender’s CGA 
parameters. When this happens the CGA verification process 
on the receiver’s side will fail. Thus the communication 
between a legitimate sender and receiver is prevented. It is also 
possible for an attacker to conduct a Duplicate Address 
Detection DoS Attack which will prevent a CGA node from 
joining a link. An attacker can copy the CGA parameters and 
the signature and then respond with a Neighbor Advertisement 
(NA) message that contains the same security parameters. In 
this way the attacker can prevent the CGA address 
configuration for all nodes attached to a local link. Another 
type of attack is one in which the victim’s node is kept busy 
with the verification process. An attacker will inundate the 
verifier with valid or invalid CGA signed messages. 
In this paper we analyze the possible methods an attacker 
could use to attack the standard CGA [2]. The conclusions that 
we have reached are first, that the CGA verification process is 
still vulnerable to DoS attacks. Therefore we proposed an 
extension to the CGA verification algorithm in order to 
eliminate this attack. Second, an attacker can capture and 
replay the sender’s CGA parameters so that the verification 
process fails on the verifier side. To combat this attack the 
CGA should include a Timestamp Option in order to mitigate 
this type of   attack. Third, that CGA may be susceptible to 
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privacy related attacks. Thus we extend it to make it more 
privacy-conscious by changing the addresses over time. 
Changing the addresses over time makes it more difficult for 
eavesdroppers to correlate when different addresses are used 
for different activities corresponding to the same node. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 
II briefly summarizes the CGA algorithm, Section III analyzes 
the CGA attack types and costs and suggests modifications that 
can be made to the standard CGA. Section IV presents the 
implementation of the proposed extensions, besides 
implementing some attacks against CGA in practice.  Finally, 
Section V summarizes our conclusions. 
II. CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY GENERATED 
ADDRESSES (CGAS) 
In this section we will provide a review of the works related 
to the basic idea of CGA and then briefly introduce the 
standard CGA generation and verification algorithms being 
used. At the end of this section we will introduce a security 
analysis of the standard CGA. 
A. CGA Related Work 
The idea of using Cryptographically Generated Addresses 
first appeared in the Child-proof Authentication for MIPv6 
(CAM) which was proposed by O’Shea and Roe [3]. In the 
CAM approach, the hash of the owner’s public key is added to 
the interface ID portion of IPv6 address. Later Nikander [4] 
suggested an improvement and an extension to the CAM 
approach to make it more resistant to birthday collision by 
adding some “random” data to the hash input. Montenegro and 
Castelluccia [5] worked on a similar proposal for Mobile IPv6. 
The final model of CGA was proposed by Aura [1] and was 
standardized in RFC 3972 [2]. 
Introduction of the Hash Extension is the main difference 
between Aura’s proposal [1] and the earlier proposals. The use 
of a 64-bit value does not adequately protect the address from a 
security standpoint. The Hash Extension technique increases 
the hash length beyond the 64-bit limit without actually 
increasing its length. This technique increases both the cost of 
generating a new CGA address and the cost of initiating a 
brute-force attack against the address. This is realized by a 
scaling factor called the Security Parameter (Sec) which 
determines the level of security for each generated address. 
Henceforth the term CGA will be used to refer to the 
standardized CGA which appears in RFC 3972. 
B. CGA Algorithm 
Instead of a single hash value, the standard CGA [2] 
computes two independent one-way hash values (Hash1 and 
Hash2). The purpose of the second hash (Hash2), Hash 
Extension, is to increase the cost of the brute-force attack 
without increasing the length of the hash output value which is 
written to the interface ID portion of IPv6 address. 
The computational complexity of Hash2 depends on the Sec 
value. The Sec is an unsigned 3-bit integer having a value 
between 0 and 7 (0 being the least secure while 7 the most) 
which indicates the security level of the generated address 
against brute-force attacks. 
The procedure for the CGA generation process is depicted in 
Figure 1. The algorithm uses as input values; Public Key, 
Modifier, Subnet Prefix, and Sec value. The output from the 
CGA algorithm is CGA address and CGA parameters which 
are comprised of the following fields: 
 Modifier (128-bit): initialized to a random value. 
 Subnet Prefix (64-bit): set to the routing prefix value 
advertised by the router at the local subnet. 
 Collision Count (8-bits): a collision counter used for 
Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) to ensure the 
uniqueness of the generated address. 
 Public Key (variable length): set to the Distinguished 
Encoding Rules (DER) encoded public key of the 
address owner. 
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Figure 1.  CGA Generation Algorithm. 
 Extension Field: variable length field for future use.  
CGA generation begins by determining the address owner’s 
public key and selecting the proper Sec value to use. The 
process continues with the Hash2 computation loop which 
finds the Final Modifier which satisfies the condition where the 
16×Sec leftmost bits of the Hash2 are equal to zero. The Hash2 
value is a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-1 hash value over all 
CGA parameters (the Public Key and Collision Counts are 
zeros). The address generator tries different values for the 
Modifier until the 16×Sec-leftmost-bit of Hash2 computes to 
zero. Once a match is found, the loop for the Hash2 
computation terminates. At this point the Final Modifier value 
is saved and used as an input for the Hash1 computation. The 
Hash1 value is a hash created by the combination of all of the 
CGA parameters. Then the interface ID is derived from the 
Hash1 value. The hash value is truncated to the appropriate 
length (64-bit). The Sec value is encoded into the three leftmost 
bits of the interface ID. The 7th and 8th (u and g) bits, from the 
left of interface ID, are reserved for a special purpose; they are 
equal to 1 to identify a field as a CGA address. Thus, the hash 
output of the CGA parameters will be distributed across the 
remaining 59 bits of the interface ID. The concatenation of the 
subnet prefix (64-bit leftmost bits) with the interface ID portion 
forms the completed IPv6 address. The subnet prefix can be a 
routable global prefix which is obtained by listening for the 
local Router Advertisement (RA) or local link prefix. Finally a 
DAD algorithm is executed against this tentative address to 
ensure that there is no address collision within the same subnet. 
If an address conflict does occur, then the Collision Count will 
be incremented and the Hash1 process will be repeated until a 
link-unique address is obtained or the Collision Count reaches 
2 (after three collisions).  
The fact is that fulfilling the condition of Hash2 is the 
computationally expensive part of CGA generation. Selecting a 
high Sec value may cause an unacceptable delay in address 
generation. For a Sec value greater than zero there is a 
probabilistic guarantee that the process will stop after a certain 
number of iterations but not exactly when. Thus, the required 
time to find the final Modifier that satisfies the condition where 
16×Sec = 0 is very diverse for the same Sec value. We 
measured the generation time of 1000 CGAs with Sec =1 and 
with 1024-bit RSA key size. We found that the required time to 
satisfy the Hash2 condition and to find a valid CGA varied 
between 10 to 2060 milliseconds. Our CGA calculation was 
performed using a computer with a 2.67 GHz CPU speed.    
To assert the ownership of an address and to protect the 
message, the address owner uses a corresponding private key to 
sign messages sent from that address. Signing a message using 
CGA requires the combined use of the CGA address, the 
associated CGA parameters, the message, and the private key 
that corresponds to the Public Key in the CGA parameters. 
Finally, the node will send the message, the CGA parameters, 
and the signature to the receiver node. 
CGA verification takes as an input the IPv6 address and the 
CGA parameters. If the verification succeeds, the verifier 
knows that the public key belongs to that address. The verifier 
can then use the Public Key to authenticate the signed messages 
received from that address. According to RFC3972, the 
verification process is achieved by executing the following 
steps: 
 Check that the Collision Count value is 0, 1 or 2, and 
that the Subnet Prefix value is equal to the subnet 
prefix of the address. The CGA verification fails if 
either check fails. 
 Concatenate the CGA parameters and execute the hash 
algorithm (SHA-1) on the concatenation. The 64 
leftmost bits of the result make up Hash1. 
 Compare Hash1 with the interface ID of the address. 
Differences in the u and g bits and in the three leftmost 
bits are ignored. If the 64-bit values differ (other than 
in the five ignored bits), the CGA verification fails. 
 Read the security parameter (Sec) from the three 
leftmost bits of the interface ID of the address. 
 Concatenate the Modifier, 64+8 zero bits and the 
Public Key. Execute the hash algorithm on the 
concatenation. The leftmost 112 bits of the result make 
up Hash2. 
 Compare the 16×Sec leftmost bits of Hash2 with zero. 
If any one of these is non-zero, CGA verification fails. 
Otherwise, the verification succeeds. If Sec=0, 
verification never fails in this step. 
In addition to the CGA verification process outlined above, 
the verifier uses the Public Key to verify the signature on the 
message. If the signature is valid, the verifier knows that the 
message was sent by the specific IPv6 address. 
The CGA algorithm increases the computational cost for 
both the attacker and the address generator (owner). For Sec 
values greater than zero, the address generator needs, on 
average, O(2
16×Sec
) iterations to complete a brute-force search 
in order to satisfy the Hash2 condition and to find the Final 
Modifier. This requires that the attacker performs a brute-force 
search for (16×Sec+59) hash bits which costs, on average, 
O(2
16×Sec + 59
). Hence, increasing the Sec value by 1 adds 16 bits 
to the length of hash that the attacker must break. 
III. POSSIBLE ATTACKS TO COMROMISE A CGA NODE  
There are several possible ways for an attacker to 
compromise a CGA node. Some of these methods are known 
and are mentioned in the literature while others are not. These 
methods include; discovering an alternative key pair hashing 
for the victim’s node address, performing a Global Time-
Memory Trade-Off attack, and carrying out DoS attacks on the 
verification process. In this section we will discuss, in more 
detail, these attacks and possible approaches that may be used 
to mitigate them. The proposed mitigation approaches come 
solely within the CGA domain without needing to rely on other 
deployments. 
A. Discover an Alternative Key Pair Hashing of the Victim's 
Node Address (Second Pre-image Attack) 
In this case an attacker would have to find an alternate key 
pair hashing of the victim’s address. The success of this attack 
will rely on the security properties of the underlying hash 
function, i.e., an attacker will need to break the second pre-
image resistance of that hash function. The standard CGA, 
RFC 3972, proposes the use of SHA-1 which may be 
vulnerable to collision attacks [6]. The RFC 4982 [7] analyzes 
the implications of attacks against hash functions and updates 
the CGA's specifications in support of multiple hash 
algorithms. We thus recommend the use of an alternative hash 
function instead of SHA-1, such as SHA-256 which has proven 
to be safe against a collision attack. 
The attacker will perform a second pre-image attack on a 
specific address in order to match other CGA parameters with 
Hash1 and Hash2. When the underlying hash function has no 
weaknesses, the following equation, authored by Bos, Özen, 
and Hfubaux [8], can be used to define the cost (  : hash 
function evaluation) of the attack: 
    {
                                                 
(     )                               
(         )                            
 (1) 
It is clear that the strength of the CGA depends on the Sec 
value. If the user uses a sufficient security level, it will be not 
feasible for an attacker to carry out this attack due to the cost 
involved. On the other hand, a large Sec value may lead to 
significant and undesirable address generation delay. We found 
that for a Sec value 2, the CGA address computation takes 
several hours, on average, on a computer with 2.67 GHz CPU 
speed, but it can take several days. Therefore users will 
probably opt for a Sec value of 0 or 1. They will accept that 
“good enough security” is better than very strong security with 
a cost of waiting for days or years to achieve this level of 
security. One proposed modification to the standard CGA in 
order to limit the time that CGA generation may takes is 
proposed by AlSa’deh et al. [9]. The authors modified the CGA 
generation algorithm to take the time that the user is willing to 
wait for CGA generation and determine the Sec value as an 
output of Hash2 computation.     
B. Find the Victim Node’s Private Key 
Another possible method an attacker can use is to find the 
private key for a given public key. In this case the attacker will 
be able to impersonate the CGA address and forge signatures. 
Here we will not talk about breaking the RSA by factoring the 
public key modulus because we assume that the RSA is strong 
enough as long as an appropriate key length is used. Our focus 
here is on the situation where the attacker exploits an insecure, 
specific implementation of the RSA. For instance, if the private 
key is stored in an insecure place, an attacker may discover it. 
In this case choosing a long key size will not guarantee that the 
RSA scheme is safe. 
We propose the generation of the key pairs automatically 
inside the CGA code so that the keys are not stored in a 
particular path before starting the CGA generation. After 
generating the CGA, the key pairs are stored in the device’s 
memory (RAM) for quick accessibility. In this manner the 
node is forced to regenerate a new key pair after rebooting the 
system. The recommended default key length for the RSA is 
1024 bits [10]. The user will, however, be able to change the 
default value of the CGA generation input parameters. 
C. Global Time-Memory Trade-Off Attack 
As shown by Bos et al. [8], CGAs are vulnerable to global 
Time-Memory Trade-Off (TMTO) attacks. The attacker needs 
to do an exhaustive search for hash collision or create a large 
pre-computed database of interface IDs from the attacker’s own 
public key(s) which are used to find matches for many 
addresses. Therefore, they proposed a more secure version, 
called CGA++, to resist this type of attack. In CGA++, the 
Subnet Prefix is included in the calculation of Hash2, and then 
the Modifier, Collision Count, and Subnet Prefix values are 
signed by the private key corresponding to that public key. In 
this way TMTO cannot be applied globally. The attacker would 
have to do a brute-force search for each address prefix 
separately. 
However, we believe that the global Time-Memory Trade-
Off attack against CGA is not an easy attack due to the 
practical problems in carrying it out. It is not easy to 
impersonate a random node in a network because a large 
amount of storage is required in order to carry this attack out. 
For a network of the size 2
16
, the attacker would need to have 
128 terabytes of storage [8]. The CGA++ enhancement also 
comes with a new, additional signature. This new signature 
adds new additional cost due to the number of signature 
generations/verifications necessary and the size of the attached 
signature to each message. CGA++, therefore, requires much 
more computational time than that for the generation of a CGA 
using the same Sec value. CGA++ does enhance the security of 
the CGA global address against a TMTO attack but it does not 
solve the problem with local link addresses because the local 
link prefix is the same for all subnets. To obtain a more 
compact CGA++, the work in [11] adopts the Elliptic Curve 
Cryptograph (ECC) keys in CGA++ instead of standardized 
RSA keys in order to minimize the size of CGA parameters and 
reduce CGA generation time. 
The probability of success for the attacks outlined above in 
subsection III.A to C is quite small, but not zero, and the cost 
of the attacks may exceed the benefits gained from them. For 
instance, the attacker may need to do a brute-force search for a 
long period of time using a powerful processor in order to 
break the second pre-image resistance. Also, for a TMTO 
attack the attacker would need a very large storage capacity. 
However there are still other ways to compromise CGA nodes 
as will be shown in the following subsections. 
D. Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack Against the CGA 
Verification Process 
An attacker can conduct DoS attacks on some particular 
steps within the CGA verification process. He can perform a 
DoS attack against the DAD check and the CGA parameter 
verification. 
1) DoS Attack Against the DAD-CGA 
It is well known that the DAD algorithm defined in IPv6 is 
susceptible to a DoS attack as was stated in section 4.1.3 of 
RFC 3756 [12]. Each time the victim’s node performs a DAD 
on a tentative address, an attacker can reply by saying that the 
address is already in use. Thus the victim’s node will be unable 
to configure the IP address so that it can join the network. 
It was proposed that to counter this type of attack the CGA 
process use signed DAD and Neighbor Advertisement (NA) 
messages [2]. If the NA message sent in response to a DAD 
does not fulfill the validity check, then the verification fails and 
the node performing the DAD discards that response. The 
verifier checks the validity of both the CGA parameters and the 
signature. 
However, it is still possible to conduct the DoS attack on 
DAD in order to prevent a CGA node from joining a link. If the 
attacker replays a NA message in order to gain a valid 
signature, then this security protection will be void. In this way 
the attacker does not need to do any brute-force searches 
against the CGA in order to carry out this attack. Below is the 
detailed description of this type of attack. 
A CGA node (victim) that wants to configure a CGA will 
generate a DAD and send it over the local link. When an 
attacker receives this packet he can immediately copy the IP 
address, CGA parameters, and signature. Then he replies with 
an NA message that has the same valid signature and CGA 
parameters. The victim’s node receives the reply via a secure 
NA message and checks its validity as defined by the CGA 
verification algorithm. If it is valid, because the signature is 
valid and the reply was received in the allotted time frame, then 
the victim will increment its Collision Count value, and try 
another address. If the attacker replies again and the Collision 
Count reaches 2, the victim stops and reports an error. Even 
though this attack is limited to DoS attacks because the attacker 
does not have the private key needed to sign messages, the 
attacker can prevent the CGA address configuration for all new 
nodes that want to attach to the local link. 
There are some constraints on the attacker’s ability to carry 
out the above attack. First, the attacker needs to have access to 
the link resources and must be able to listen to multicast 
packets sent by the victim’s node. Second, the attacker needs to 
conduct the attack within a short period of time. The attacker’s 
response should be fast enough, i.e., to replay the packet and 
send it before the end of the DAD process. RFC 4862 [13] 
specifies this delay by using a RetransTimer variable. The 
default value for the RetransTimer is 1,000 milliseconds. 
One possible solution would be for the host to discard the 
same DAD, i.e., the DAD with the same tentative address, 
CGA parameters, and signature that was sent before. The 
probability that two nodes would generate the same RSA key 
pair is very small [14]. Having the same public key and the 
same CGA parameters is a clear indication of an attack. 
Therefore, if a node receives a CGA protected message with 
the same CGA parameters and signature as its own, the node 
assumes this message was sent by an attacker and discards it. 
In the case of receiving a DAD message from a non-CGA 
(unsecured) node or from a tentative address with different 
CGA parameters and signature, one heuristic solution is to trust 
the first three DAD failures that occurred with a specific node 
in a given link layer. After that, ignore any DAD failures and 
consider the other node as a malicious node and use tentative 
address in DAD process as a valid address. 
The probability that two legitimate CGA nodes will 
generate the same interface ID is very low. The following 
formula, which was defined by Bagnulo, et al. [15], defines the 
probability of having at least two nodes generate the same 
interface ID: 
  (   )    (
     
 
)
   
            (2) 
Where CGA addresses, n=2
59
 and k is the number of 
interfaces in the same link. For a large subnet with one hundred 
thousand (100,000) interface IDs, the Pb(2
59
,100000) <=1.7e-
08. Accordingly, this very small probability makes the heuristic 
approach reasonable. Receiving three NA messages as a 
response to DAD is a strong indication of malicious activity. 
The CGA DAD verification process can be extended as 
follows. When a DAD is detected, the node should check to see 
whether or not the NA message contains the exact CGA 
parameters as those used in the NS message that it sent. If the 
message received as a response to the NS DAD contains the 
same CGA parameters and signature as its own, then discard 
this message and consider the tentative address as a valid 
address and start using it. When the received response to the 
NS DAD comes from a non-CGA, then the node generates 
another tentative CGA. If after three consecutive attempts a 
non-unique address is generated, the CGA node will consider it 
as an attack and will discard the NA message from that non-
CGA node and will start using this tentative address. Figure 2 
depicts a flowchart of DAD extension used to eliminate the 
DoS in the CGA-DAD process. 
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Figure 2.  The flowchart of a DAD extension used to eliminate a DoS attack 
in the CGA-DAD 
 2) DoS Attack by Replaying the Sender CGA Parameters 
CGA is vulnerable to a replay attack where an attacker can 
sniff and store signed messages from the victim’s node and 
replay them later. It is easy for an attacker to conduct a DoS 
attack against a CGA-enabled host by replaying the sender’s 
CGA parameter. The CGA-enabled receiver is required to 
calculate Hash1in order to verify the interface ID of the sender. 
This verification requires that the sender sends its CGA 
parameters to the receiver. If the attacker modifies any of the 
CGA parameters, Hash1 will fail. It would be easy for the 
attacker to modify the Collision Count so that it exceeds 2 
thereby making the verification process fail. In this way the 
attacker can prevent the communication between a CGA-
enabled sender and receiver. 
The use of the Timestamp Option of SEcure Neighbor 
Discovery (SEND) [10] eliminates the possibility of a replay 
attack. We therefore recommend the use of this option with 
CGA even when CGA is deployed alone. The verifier will thus 
not receive two messages with the same signature since two 
successive messages from the same node will have a different 
timestamp and thus different signatures. Therefore, we suggest 
not using CGA as a lone option. The Timestamp option must be 
used with CGA. Details describing these options can be found 
in RFC 3972.  
3) DoS to Kill a CGA Node 
Sending a valid or invalid CGA signed message with high 
frequency across the network can keep the destination node(s) 
busy with the verification process. This type of DoS attack is 
not specific to CGA but it can apply to any request-response 
protocol. One possible solution to mitigate this attack is to add 
a controller at the verifier side to determine the maximum 
number of messages that the receiver can accept within a 
certain period of time from a specific node. If this threshold 
rate is exceeded, the receiver drops the new incoming messages 
from that node. 
E. CGA Privacy Implication 
Due to the high computational complexity necessary for the 
creation of a CGA, it is likely that once a node generates an 
acceptable CGA it will continue to use it at that subnet. The 
result is that nodes using CGAs are still susceptible to privacy 
related attacks. Using the same address for a long time makes it 
possible for an attacker to violate the users’ privacy by tracking 
an individual’s device(s) online. In practice, a lot of devices 
(e.g., laptops, cell phones, etc.) are associated with individual 
users. Therefore, changing the CGA should be done often 
enough to prevent the attacker from collecting enough 
information about the node to mount an attack. 
We think that the CGA privacy implication can be resolved 
by setting a lifetime (the length of time the address can be 
used) for a CGA address. When this time has elapsed, a new 
CGA, with a new CGA parameter, should be generated. We 
also propose that the key generation be included in the CGA 
code. This will force the node to generate a new address when 
it is rebooted or moved to a new location. When using 
changeable CGA addresses, it makes no sense to select a high 
security parameter (Sec). There should be a balance between 
the CGA lifetime and the security level. We do not recommend 
the use of a Sec value greater than 1. 
To protect the users’ privacy we propose changing the CGA 
addresses periodically. These temporary CGA addresses would 
be used for a certain period of time (hours to days as 
recommended in RFC 4941 [16]) and would then be 
deprecated. Deprecated addresses can continue to be used for 
connections that are already established, but they are not to be 
used to initiate new connections. Once a CGA address is 
deprecated, a new CGA should be used. 
The lifetime of a temporary CGA address depends on 
several parameters and actions. For instance, the lifetime will 
be dependent on the time needed for a host to generate a new 
CGA address (TG), the time needed for an attacker to break the 
CGA address (TA) and a user desired setting for security and 
privacy. The following lists the conditions under which a new 
temporary CGA address should be generated:  
 When a host joins a new subnet. In this case, the new 
CGA parameters will be used to generate the new 
address. A new public key will be used for calculating 
both the Hash1 and Hash2 values. 
 Before the lifetime for the in-use CGA address has 
expired. To ensure that the CGA address is always 
available and valid, new CGAs should be generated in 
advance before the predecessor is deprecated. In 
practice, a valid time should not be zero. We 
recommend a minimum value for a lifetime to be one 
hour. 
 If the prefix has expired, a new CGA address will need 
to be generated and it must include the newly received 
prefix in the Hash1 calculation. 
 When the user needs to override the default value in 
order to generate a new CGA address. The CGA 
implementation should offer the user the ability to 
override the default values and force the CGA 
algorithm to generate a new address. 
The lifetime of a CGA address (Tl) should be safe enough 
so that the attacker is not able to impersonate the other nodes’ 
addresses. We recommend that TA be at least nTl (where n is an 
integer) in order to have a safe margin. Clearly, the speed of 
hash function computation depends on the CPU speed of the 
computing device. Reading the CPU speed by using the CGA 
code makes it possible to determine whether or not the selected 
lifetime is suitable. On the other hand, the Tl time should be 
greater than the time required for the node to generate a CGA 
address. It is not feasible to invest the time and resources of the 
computing device to create an address and then, after a very 
short period of time, deprecate this address. We recommend 
that Tl be greater than mTG (where m is an integer). Therefore, 
Tl can be described by the following equation: 
        
  
 
    (3) 
Where m and n are integers 
IV. EVALUATION AND IMPLEMENTATION 
According to RFC 4861 [17], the maximum time a node 
holds an IP address of neighboring nodes in its neighbor cache 
is 30 seconds. This time is defined by a constant called 
REACHABLE_TIME. Based on REACHABLE_TIME and 
the CGA message verification time (TVerification), the attacker can 
determine the number of ND messages (NND) necessary for the 
generation of a DoS attack against the CGA verification 
process. Formula 4 calculates the required number of packets 
for the generation of this DoS attack.  
       
              
             
   (4)  
To carry out this attack against the CGA verification 
process, we implemented a small program that calls NA 
generation and verification functions and then writes the 
average time to execute these functions to a file. Table I shows 
the average (Avg.), minimum (Min.), and maximum (Max.) 
times, in milliseconds, required for NA packet generation and 
for the verification process of a NA message. We obtained this 
data by running the NA packet generation 100 times. 
TABLE I.  NA GENERATIONAND VERIFICATION FOR 100 SAMPLES   
NA generation time 
(milliseconds) 
NA verification time  
(milliseconds) 
Avg. Min. Max. Avg. 
51.35 5 221 12.5 
 
By referring to formula 4 and Table I, one can see that the 
attacker needs to generate a minimum of 2400 NA messages 
with different CGA values before he starts sending them over 
the network in sequential order within an infinite loop. The 
attacker can do this before starting his DoS attack against the 
verification process on the victim node. This prevents the 
victim node from detecting old NA messages and thus for each 
message a new verification process would be started. The 
victim node first checks whether or not that address exists in its 
neighbor cache. If the address does not exist, the victim node 
starts the verification process to check whether or not the node 
is authorized for that address. Then, if the verification is 
successful, it adds that IP address to its neighbor cache. Based 
on our experimental results, the victim node CPU is kept busy 
processing the attacker’s packet and, then, finally, the victim’s 
buffer will overflow making it impossible to process more 
packets. 
We evaluated the aforementioned attack in a test scenario 
on a computer with three Virtual Machines (VMs) running 
windows 7 as a guest Operating System (OS). All VMs are in 
the same local network and have 2 GB RAM with a 2.6 GHz 
CPU. All the VMs use the default values of the CGA 
parameters, i.e., RSA key size 1024 and Sec value 1. VM1 
plays the role of the attacker. It runs our small application that 
generates different CGA values and sends NA messages in 
order to execute DoS attacks against the CGA verification 
process on the victim node. VM2 runs a simulated router that 
can send RA messages. VM3 is the victim node. 
In our tests we extended the standard CGA to mitigate DoS 
and privacy-related attacks. We modified the CGA function of 
our WinSEND implementation [18]. WinSEND is a user space 
SEND implementation for the Windows family of software. It 
has all the functionality of SEND and can be easily installed on 
systems. We modified the CGA part and disabled the other 
SEND options in WinSEND in order to focus on CGA attacks.  
The modified version of WinSEND uses the parameters 
necessary to generate a temporary CGA address as the default. 
The default value for the minimum valid lifetime is up to one 
day, the public key size is 1024-bit, and the default value for 
Sec is 1. The user can override these parameters because such 
default values may not always fits with the users requirements. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs), as defined 
in RFC 3972, offer a means of authenticating the identity of 
communication nodes in a network. This is accomplished by 
finding the relationship between the addresses and public keys. 
In CGA, the interface ID is a cryptographic one-way hash of 
the node’s public key and other parameters. 
In this study we have analyzed the security of and threats to 
the standard CGA. Several types of attacks and their 
countermeasures are explained. We found that CGAs are still 
vulnerable to some types of attack, such as DoS and replay 
attacks. We thus proposed extensions to RFC 3972 in order to 
eliminate the standard CGA’s vulnerability to the kinds of 
attacks that we uncovered. Even though DoS attacks against 
CGA were known there were no countermeasures proposed by 
other researchers. We suggest the use of extensions and 
enhancements to the CGA verification process in order to 
defeat the DoS attack against the DAD algorithm. We also 
propose the use of the Timestamp Option within CGA when it 
is run alone and not as a part of SEND. CGA may also be 
susceptible to privacy related attacks. Specifying a lifetime for 
a CGA address can resolve this privacy issue. However, this 
approach definitely involves tradeoffs between privacy and 
security, but it is a very viable solution. The new extensions 
can easily be added to the original CGA without affecting its 
performance or its security level. We will write these 
extensions as an update to RFC 3972. 
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